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Promotion by Oil Company of TBA Products Held
Violative of FTC Section 5--Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC*
The Atlantic Refining Company entered into an agreement with
the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company which provided that
Atlantic would receive a commission on all tires, batteries, and
accessories (TBA) sold by Atlantic's wholesale and retail dealers.
This commission was to be paid Atlantic in consideration for
assistance given in promoting Goodyear products to the independent Atlantic service station operators. 1 After an investigation of
these agreements the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint
against Goodyear and Atlantic charging them with violating section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.2 Evidence introduced at a
hearing before a Federal Trade Commission trial examiner showed
that Atlantic had coerced its dealers into purchasing Goodyear TBA
by implying that renewal of their dealers' leases or equipment
loans depended upon these purchases. The trial examiner found
that through this coercion Atlantic implemented tacit tying arrangements in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, and he formulated a cease-and-desist order prohibiting Atlantic's
use of coercion on its dealers. The Federal Trade Commission
affirmed the findings of the trial examiner but went further and
defined the basic issue to be the legality of the sales commission
agreements themselves:

• 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15,
1964) (No. 296).
I. "Under the terms of the contract between Goodyear and Atlantic .•• , Atlantic
is entitled to a commission amounting to 10 per cent of the net sales value of all
sponsored (i.e., Goodyear •..) merchandise sold by Atlantic retail dealers, as consideration for the assistance given by the Atlantic sales organization in obtaining TBA
orders from Atlantic dealers." Goodyear Tire 8: Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 335 (1961).
The agreement between Atlantic and Goodyear covered only half of the Atlantic
trading area. For the other half, Atlantic had a duplicate agreement with Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company.
2. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958).

714

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 6!1

"Atlantic has sufficient economic power with respect to its
wholesale and retail petroleum distributors to cause them to
purchase substantial quantities of sponsored TBA even without
the use of overt coercive tactics or of written or oral tying
agreements. . . . Determination of illegality in this context
requires an evaluation of the competitive effects resulting from
the sales commission method of distributing TBA . . . ." 3
Finding that the sales commission system effected a substantial
foreclosure of markets on all levels of the TBA industry,4 the Commission expanded the examiner's order by prohibiting Atlantic or
Goodyear from further participation in sales commission agreements
with any other TBA manufacturer or oil company.5
This order was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit. 6 While the
court of appeals admitted that "labeling is at times more harmful
than helpful in formulating conceptions that correspond to reality," 7
and further conceded that the contract between Goodyear and
Atlantic had no tying features on its face, it found that the sales
commission system was analogous to a tying arrangement8 and that
it contained inherently unlawful features in light of the economic
"servitude" imposed on the dealers by the oil companies.9 The
court avoided any mechanical comparisons between the classical
tie-in and the arrangement before it, but considered the effect of
each on competition, reasoning that the sales commission scheme,
like an explicitly stated tying arrangement, required the dealer to
s:urrender his freedom to choose between competing brands of TBA.
The Goodyear case is one of a series of actions filed by the FTC
against the sales commission system, the favored device by which
major oil companies and TBA manufacturers paid off in the distribution of TBA products.10 The practical result of the system
3. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 364-65 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
4. Id. at 369.
5. Id. at 369-70.
6. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. ITC, 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. granted,
33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) (No. 296).
7. Id. at 400.
8. Id. at 402. A tying arrangement has been defined by the Supreme Court as "an
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer
also purchases a different (or tied) product ••••" Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. l, 5 (1958). Because such arrangements force the buyer to surrender his
freedom of choice between competing products in the market for the tied product,
they have fared poorly for many years under the antitrust laws. See United States v.
Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
9. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. ITC, 331 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) (No. 296). As a tying arrangement the
sales commission agreements were found to be illegal upon application of the doctrine of
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, supra note 8, which held that such restraints were
unreasonable per se whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the
tying product appreciably to restrain competition in the market for the tied product
and a not insubstantial amount of commerce is affected.
10. For a list of those oil companies with whom Goodyear has sales commission
agreements, see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 323 (1961).
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has been that those independent dealers who "fly the flag" of a
major oil company may handle only the TBA products that yield
their oil company a commission. Prior to the adoption of the sales
commission system the method most often used was the purchaseresale plan, an arrangement that involved the purchase and warehousing of the TBA by the oil companies and a subsequent resale
by them directly to their dealers. 11 Until the Commission developed
the approach used in the Goodyear case, neither of these two
methods was considered illegal in itself. However, United States v.
Sun Oil Co. 12 held illegal oral or tacit tying arrangements found to
accompany the purchase-resale plans when they were coercively
exacted. The Court found that Sun's salesmen coerced its dealers
by making pointed references to the oil company's 30-day cancellation provision while suggesting that the dealers handle Sun's TBA
to the exclusion of other brands. Sun was enjoined from "inducing,
coercing and compelling" its dealers to enter into tacit agreements
to deal exclusively in the TBA sold by Sun,13 although the continued use of the purchase-resale plan was not prohibited. In Osborn
v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,14 sales commission agreements involving similar
coercive tying arrangements were considered. The plaintiff in that
case brought a private antitrust suit charging that his lease had been
cancelled because he had not purchased substantial quantities of
Goodyear TBA. The court found that Sinclair had engaged in an
illegal course of conduct toward Osborn and its other dealers by
conditioning their continued operation on the placing of substantial
orders for Goodyear TBA. 15 Thus, the courts have looked with disfavor on the oil companies' use of coercive power over their dealers
to reap profits in another market. However, the courts went only
so far as to enjoin or punish the use of overt coercive power by the
oil companies.
The novelty of Goodyear lies in the court's finding that, in light
of the realities of power in the oil distribution industry, the oil
companies can achieve the desired foreclosure of markets without
following any demonstrably coercive course of conduct. The court
viewed the relationship between the dealer and the oil company
as an inherently coercive one in which the dealer was "more of an
economic serf than a businessman" because of the great leverage
provided the oil company by the lease and equipment loan contracts
under which most of the dealers operate. 16 It recognized that in such
11. See Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 397-98 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) (No. 296).
12. 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
13. Id. at 739.
14. 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 96!! (1961).
15. Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832, 836 (4th Cir. 1960).
16. Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) (No. 296).
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a context coercion can assume forms that would put its detection
and control beyond the reach of the judicial process; therefore, it
held the sales commission agreement, the oil companies' method of
exploiting this power, was itself the evil to be eliminated. 17 To
build and equip a modern service station requires an initial investment beyond the resources of the ordinary service station operator. 18
The normal practice is for the dealer to lease his station, fully
equipped, from the oil company. If the station is owned by someone other than the company, the dealer signs an equipment loan
contract for the equipment necessary to operate the station. Both
of these agreements are characteristically short-term arrangements,
generally of one year, and the lease contains numerous cancellation
provisions which make the term of occupancy, in actuality, a matter
of the oil company's discretion. 19 The immediate financial hardships
of cancellation for the dealers are augmented by the understandable
reluctance of other oil companies to take on a dealer who has been
cancelled by another company. It is only natural for the dealer to be
hesitant to arouse the displeasure of the oil company.20 "In that
setting," the Goodyear court concluded, "recommendation is tantamount to command . . . . Sophisticated methods of pressuring the
dealers into carrying sponsored TBA are as effectual as express
covenants and open threats.'' 21
Prior to the Goodyear decision, when the sales commission agreements were considered legal unless coercion was involved, courts
generally were faced with the rather difficult problem of drawing a
line between effective salesmanship and duress. By equating recom17. A significant amount of money is involved in these cases. The 1955 sales of
TBA made by Goodyear through the Atlantic dealers came to $5,700,121, from which
Atlantic realized $557,599. Firestone, whose sales commission agreement covered those
Atlantic dealers not assigned to Goodyear, made sales in the same year to Atlantic
dealers totalling $5,562,936 and paid Atlantic "overrides" of $506,199. When Atlantic's
reward for pressuring its dealers comes to over one million dollars annually it naturally
would be difficult to resist the temptation to do so. See Goodyear Tire 8: Rubber Co.,
58 F.T.C. 309, 315-16 (1961).
18. The Commission found in a companion case to Goodyear that the cost of
"constructing a modem service station, including land, averages about $90,000."
Firestone Tire 8: Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 371, 403 (1961).
19. These provisions, in Atlantic's case, were laid out in their "Eleven Point Lease
Letter," which defined the standards of operation for Atlantic dealers. Though the
standards themselves seem to reflect only the legitimate interest the oil company has
in protecting its goodwill, they are couched in such vague terms as to make them
possible shields for the use of purely discretionary cancellations. These provisions,
policed by Atlantic through its regular sales force as well as "Phantom Customer
Inspectors," gave ,the oil company the ability to cancel for breach at virtually any
time it pleased. See Goodyear Tire 8: Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 338-39 (1961).
20. The trial examiner included as part of his findings that "dealers appearing to
testify were under considerable pressure because they were naturally interested in not
jeopardizing the renewal of their leases." Id. at 320.
21. Goodyear Tire 8: Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) (No. 296).
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mendation with coercion, the court in the principal case achieved
certainty and uniformity, but at the expense, it would seem, of a
reasoned inquiry into the nature of the agreements and the circumstances surrounding them. 22 The presumption that recommendation equals coercion provided the illegal link between the sales
commission agreements and the anti-competitive effects, thereby
allowing the court to make use of the tying arrangement analogy
in condemning the contracts as a section 5 violation. If the presumption is valid that the relationship between the dealer and the
oil company is inherently coercive, the outlawing of the sales commission agreements when they are found to be accompanied by
anti-competitive effects would seem to be justified. But the District
of Columbia Circuit Court has not been willing to give the Commission the benefit of this presumption. In Texaco Inc. v. FTC,23
on facts almost identical to those in the Goodyear case, it was held
that the Commission had erred in concluding that Texaco had
sufficient economic power over its dealers to force them to buy the
promoted TBA. Although the dissent in Texaco suggested that the
court's holding in favor of the oil company resulted primarily from
the failure of the Commission to articulate facts and spell out its
theories,2 4 it seems nevertheless clear that there is now a split in
the circuits on the issue of inherent coercion.25
Probably prompted by this split, the Supreme Court has agreed
to pass on the matter,26 and there are indications that it may be more
receptive to the Seventh Circuit's characterization of the dealer-oil
company relationship than that of the District of Columbia Circuit
Court. In the recent case of Simpson v. Union Oil Co.21 the Court
struck down consignment agreements between the oil company and
its dealers when they resulted in a program of resale price maintenance and when fear of nonrenewal of short-term leases was used as
a coercive policing device. In recognizing the effectiveness of the
short-term lease as a policing device, the Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Dougl~, said that the lease provided the leverage by
22. In charging a violation of § 5, the Commission is not restricted to proving any
specific prohibitions of the Sherman or Clayton Acts. See Grand Union Co. v. FTC,
l!OO F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). The broad language of § 5 would seem to encourage utilization by the Commission of an extended rule of reason when evaluating alleged illegal
conduct. See Oppenheim, Guides To Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 M1cH. L. REV. 821 (1961).
2ll. !136 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3165
(U.S. Oct. 28, 1964) (No. 635).
24. Id. at 766.
25. "The mere fact that Texaco is a giant corporation and the dealers are in the
main small businessmen cannot be said to demonstrate controlling economic power
over the latter .••." Id. at 762.
26. Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co. v. FTC, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964)
(No. 296); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964)
(No. 292).
27. !177 U.S. 13 (1964).
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which the dealers were coercively tied into an arrangement which
deprived them of the right to make independent business decisions.28
Clearly viewing the dealer-oil company relationship as inherently
coercive by reason of the short-term service station leases, the Court
did not require that overt coercion be shown in order to prove that
the dealers were being forced into an acceptance of the resale price
maintenance program. All that was held to be necessary for a showing of the existence of coercive policing of the consignment agreements was evidence that the desired result was being achieved. 29
The Supreme Court's rather clear recognition of the inherently
coercive nature of the dealer-oil company relationship, as well as
its more basic concern with the welfare of the small "independent"
businessmen who operate gasoline stations, may, however, cause the
Court to oversimplify other factors in the sales commission system
of TBA distribution. If the position of the Seventh Circuit is upheld, the logical result would be the prohibition of any participation
by the oil companies in the distribution of TBA to their dealers.
For, should the oil companies return to the purchase-resale plan,
the Commission, using the Goodyear tying arrangement theory,
need merely find that a not insubstantial amount of commerce is
affected to declare the plan illegal.30 However, even if the questionable presumption of coercion is valid, there is a further relevant
consideration. In its opening observation regarding the difficulty
of formulating conceptions that correspond to actualities, the
Goodyear court implies that its decision is firmly based upon the
realities of the oil distribution industry, and specifically the actual
position of the dealer vis-a-vis the oil company. "Ostensibly, they
are independent businessmen; but behind the legalistic facade of
independence, there exists a servitude caused by the coercive pressures which Atlantic exerts upon its dealers." 31 Underlying the
Simpson and the Goodyear and Osborn decisions seems to be a sympathetic attempt to liberate the gasoline service station operator
from his dependence upon the oil company and allow him the
position of a truly independent businessman. But as long as the
28. "By reason of the lease and 'consignment' agreement dealers are coercively
laced into an arrangement under which their supplier is able to impose noncompeti•
tive prices on persons who otherwise might be competitive." Id. at 21.
29. "If the 'consignment' agreement achieves resale price maintenance in violation
of the Sherman Act, it and the lease are being used to injure interstate commerce
by depriving independent dealers of the exercise of free judgment of whether ••• to
sell at competitive prices." Id. at 16. The similarity between this argument by Justice
Douglas and the one formulated by the Commission in the Goodyear case is striking.
The Commission in Goodyear held that if the sales commission agreement achieves a
foreclosure of markets, it and the lease are being used to injure interstate commerce
by depriving the dealer of h~s freedom to choose between brands of TBA.
30. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber .Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1964),
cert. granted, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3215 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1964) (No. 296).
31. Id. at 400.
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peculiarities of the gasoline distribution industry necessitate the
close intermingling of the interests of the oil company with the
interests of the dealers, the service station operator will never be a
truly independent businessman. The power of the oil companies
over their dealers must be sufficient to protect adequately the company's legitimate interest in the real estate and goodwill which it
has entrusted to its lessees. By signing with a major oil company
and thereby becoming a "member of the team," the dealer willingly
gives up his status as a completely independent businessman in consideration for innumerable benefits.
The realities of the situation are not as simple as the court seems
to picture them. In this light, the judiciary should be careful not to
confuse restraints of trade, which constitute clear public injury, with
mere restrictions on the freedom of the dealer to act as an independent businessman. This is where the approach of the Seventh Circuit
would seem to differ significantly from the approach of the Commission. The Commission accepted the fact that the oil companies
enjoyed controlling economic power over their dealers but did not
condemn its use as such; it condemned only the abuse of this power.
Only when it resulted in anti-competitive effects did the Commission
step in.32 By applying the tying arrangement analogy, the Seventh
Circuit effectuated an important shift in emphasis from preventing
anti-competitive effects toward protecting the dealers. Since one of
the evils of the tying arrangement, as the Court has come to view it,
is that it restricts the freedom of othenvise independent businessmen, as long as such a restriction affects a "not insubstantial"
amount of commerce the courts will intervene to free the purchaser
from these limitations. Because, however, of the necessarily "quasiindependent" character of the service station operator, the realities
of the situation should not support judicial intervention unless it
can be clearly shown that such restrictions substantially injure the
public or competitors.
32. "Atlantic has sufficient economic power with respect to its wholesale and retail
petroleum distributors to cause them to purchase substantial quantities of sponsored
TBA • • • • Determination of illegality in this context requires an evaluation of the
competitive eflects resulting from the sales commission method of distributing
TBA. ••••" (Emphasis added.) Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309, 364-65
(1961).

